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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/937,192	09/21/2001	Neal Rosen	MSK.P-038	6277
21121	7590	06/25/2004	EXAMINER	
OPPEDAHL AND LARSON LLP P O BOX 5068 DILLON, CO 80435-5068			KIFLE, BRUCK	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			1624	

DATE MAILED: 06/25/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/937,192

Applicant(s)

ROSEN ET AL.

Examiner

Bruck Kifle, Ph.D.

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --
Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 19 December 2003.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 3,4,6 and 9-34 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 3, 4, 6 and 9-34 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892) | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152) |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |

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After an appeal's conference in the work group, prosecution has been reopened. Claims 3, 4, 6 and 9-34 are pending in this application.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 3, 4, 6 and 9-34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

The independent claims require "a chemical compound comprising first and second hsp-binding moieties which bind to the pocket of hsp90 with which ansamycin antibiotics bind, said binding moieties being connected to one another by a linker." The claims do not require that the compound possess any particular conserved structure, or other distinguishing feature, such as a specific biological activity. Thus, the claims are drawn to a genus of compounds that is defined by novelty.

A chemical compound can be a pharmaceutical composition, a protein, a peptide, a non-peptide compound, an animal tissue extract, nucleic acids, sugars, antisense molecules, peptidomimetic, transformed cells, radiation, antibodies, antibody fragments, cyclic peptides, agonists, antagonists, inhibitors, enhancers, vegetable extracts, cell extracts, synthetic agents,

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biologically derived substances as well as proteinaceous substances, known, and unknown compounds.

To provide adequate written description and evidence of possession of a claimed genus, the specification must provide sufficient distinguishing identifying characteristics of the genus. The factors to be considered include disclosure of complete or partial structure, physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristics, structure/function correlation, methods of making the claimed product, or any combination thereof. The specification does not identify any particular portion of the structure that must be conserved, nor does it provide a disclosure of structure/function correlation. The distinguishing characteristics of the claimed genus are not described. Accordingly, the specification does not provide adequate written description of the claimed genus.

To satisfy the written-description requirement, the specification must describe every element of the claimed invention in sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the inventor possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing. *Vas-Cath*, 935 F.3d at 1563; see also *Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc.*, 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 [41 USPQ2d 1961] (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that “the inventor invented the claimed invention”); *In re Gosteli*, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 [10 USPQ2d 1614] (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed”). Thus, an applicant complies with the written-description requirement “by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious,”

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and by using “such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that set forth the claimed invention.” *Lockwood*, 107 F.3d at 1572.

See *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.*, 68 USPQ2d 1424 (DC WNY 2003) and *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. et al.* CAFC [(03-1304) 13 February 2004]. In *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.* a patent directed to method for inhibiting prostaglandin synthesis in a human host using an unspecified compound, in order to relieve pain without side effect of stomach irritation, did not satisfy written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112, since the patent described the compound's desired function of reducing activity of the enzyme PGHS-2 without adversely affecting PGHS-1 enzyme activity, but did not identify said compound, since the invention consists of performing “assays” to screen compounds in order to discover those with the desired effect. The patent did not name even one compound that assays would identify as suitable for practice of the invention, or provide information such that one skilled in art could identify a suitable compound. And since the specification did not indicate that compounds are available in public depository, the claimed treatment method cannot be practiced without the compound. Thus the inventors cannot be said to have “possessed” the claimed invention without knowing of a compound or method certain to produce said compound. Thus said patent constituted an invitation to experiment to first identify, then characterize, and then use a therapeutic a class of compound defined only by their desired properties.

According to the MPEP §2163 I. A. “the issue of a lack of adequate written description may arise even for an original claim when an aspect of the claimed invention has not been described with sufficient particularity such that one skilled in the art would recognize that the applicant had possession of the claimed invention. The claimed invention as a whole may not be

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adequately described if the claims require an essential or critical feature which is not adequately described in the specification and which is not conventional in the art or known to one of ordinary skill in the art.” The MPEP states in §2163 II 3 ii) “The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice (see i)(A), above), reduction to drawings (see i)(B), above), or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus (see i)(C), above). See *Eli Lilly*, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406.” Applicants have made no assertion that there is any correlation between the biological function of the compound being claimed and its structure.

According to the MPEP §2163.02 Standard for Determining Compliance With the Written Description Requirement,

“The courts have described the essential question to be addressed in a description requirement issue in a variety of ways. An objective standard for determining compliance with the written description requirement is, “does the description clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she invented what is claimed”. *In re Gosteli*, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Under *Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar*, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991), to satisfy the written description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention, and that the invention, in that context, is whatever is now claimed. The test for sufficiency of support in a parent application is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon “reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter”. *Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc.*, 772 F.2d 1570, 1575, 227 USPQ 177, 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting *In re Kaslow*, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375, 217 USPQ 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).”

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This case was filed before Applicants had a clear idea of the structures of their desired compounds, how to make their compounds and how to use them.

Applicants are reminded of what the U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit wrote in *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.* 43 USPQ2d 1398, "In claims involving chemical materials, generic formulae usually indicate with specificity what the generic claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a formula is normally an adequate description of the claimed genus." "A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is. See *Fiers*, 984 F.2d at 1169-71, 25 USPQ2d at 1605-06 (discussing Amgen). "It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what achieves that result." "The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See *In re Wilder*, 736 F.2d 1516, 1521, 222 USPQ 369, 372-73 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming rejection because the specification does "little more than outlin[e] goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate.")".

In *Fiers v. Sugano*, 25 USPQ2d 1601, U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit repeated its views concerning the propriety of defining a chemical by its function and emphasized that for all chemicals including DNA "Claiming all DNA's that achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived." They further required the inventor to have a "mental picture of the structure of the chemical, or is able to define it by its method of preparation, its

physical or chemical properties, or whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it. It is not sufficient to define it solely by its principal biological property.”

Both *Fiers v. Sugano*, 25 USPQ2d 1601 and *Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.* 18 USPQ2d 1016 were quoted with approval by the U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit in *Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories Inc.*, 32 USPQ2d 1915 who added, “An idea is definite and permanent when the inventor has a specific, settled idea, a particular solution to the problem at hand, not just a general goal or research plan he hopes to pursue. ... The conception analysis necessarily turns on the inventor's ability to describe his invention with particularity. Until he can do so, he cannot prove possession of the complete mental picture of the invention. These rules ensure that patent rights attach only when an idea is so far developed that the inventor can point to a definite, particular invention.”

Therefore the full breadth of the claim fails to meet the written description provision of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph. Applicant is reminded that *Vas-Cath* makes clear that the written description provision of 35 U.S.C. §112 is severable from its enablement provision.

Claims 3, 4, 6 and 9-34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, because the specification, while being enabling for the gelanamycin dimer, wherein the linker is 4C and bonded to the 17-carbon of each gelanamycin, to treat breast cancer, does not reasonably provide enablement for “a chemical compound comprising first and second hsp-binding moieties which bind to the pocket of hsp90 with which ansamycin antibiotics bind, said binding moieties being connected to one another by a linker” for treating any and all cancers. The specification does not enable any skilled chemist to make and use the invention commensurate in scope with these

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claims. “The factors to be considered [in making an enablement rejection] have been summarized as the quantity of experimentation necessary, the amount of direction or guidance presented, the presence or absence of working examples, the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in that art, the predictability or unpredictability of the art and the breadth of the claims”, *In re Rainer*, 146 USPQ 218 (1965); *In re Colianni*, 195 USPQ 150, *Ex parte Formal*, 230 USPQ 546. a) Determining the compound would require synthesis of millions of compounds and testing each to determine whether the compound falls within the scope of claim 1 and test each for activity against cancers. b) The direction concerning how to make the compounds being claimed is not found in the specification. c) There is one working example of a compound of claim 1 which is useful. d) The nature of the invention is chemical synthesis, which involves chemical reactions, and methods of treatments. e) The state of the art is given in the background of the invention in the specification. f) The artisan using Applicants invention to prepare the claimed compounds would be a chemist with a BS degree in chemistry and several years of experience. He would know how to make a compound given the structure and teaching of how to make it but be unaware of the structure of the compound being claimed here. g) Chemical reactions are well-known to be unpredictable, *In re Marzocchi*, 169 USPQ 367, *In re Fisher*, 166 USPQ 18. Pharmacological activity in general is a very unpredictable area. Note that in cases involving physiological activity such as the instant case, “the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved”. See *In re Fisher*, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (CCPA 1970).

Also, see *In re Surrey* 151 USPQ 724, regarding sufficiency of a disclosure for a Markush group, and MPEP 2164.03 for enablement requirements in cases directed to structure-

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sensitive arts such as the instant pharmaceutical arts. Note in *Surrey*, in which testing done on a group of homogeneous compounds having the same core was deemed NOT sufficient to support claims to various hetero groups of a much narrower range than is being claimed herein and located at only one position in the formula. The instant scope is enormous; therefore one compound within its scope is not remotely representative of such a scope. See MPEP 2164.03.

h) The breadth of the claims includes billions of compounds with radically diverse structures which bind to the pocket of hsp90.

Applicants' claims are drawn to compounds. What are the structures of these molecules and where in the specification do Applicants teach how to make this potentially limitless structural variety of such molecules? Case law is clear that such broad claims lack sufficient supporting description. Starting with a hormone case, which claimed a partially characterized peptide that was claimed in terms of its chemical properties, *In re Fisher*, 166 USPQ 18, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, wrote

It is apparent that such an inventor should be allowed to dominate the future patentable inventions of others where those inventions were based in some way on his teachings. Such improvements, while unobvious from his teachings, are still within his contribution, since the improvement was made possible by his work. It is equally apparent, however, that he must not be permitted to achieve this dominance by claims which are insufficiently supported and hence not in compliance with the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112. That paragraph requires that the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art. In cases involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements, a single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws. In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved. In the present case we must conclude, on the record before us, that appellant has not enabled the preparation of ACTHs having potencies much greater than 2.3, and the claim recitations of potency of "at

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least 1" render the claims insufficiently supported under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112.

This concept was expanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit in *Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.* 18 USPQ2d 1016 in a case concerning EPO genes. Since genes were held to be chemicals, the principle regarding enablement applies as well to all small molecules. The court held that:

A gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one, and it is well established in our law that conception of a chemical compound requires that the inventor be able to define it so as to distinguish it from other materials, and to describe how to obtain it. See *Oka*, 849 F.2d at 583, 7 USPQ2d at 1171. Conception does not occur unless one has a mental picture of the structure of the chemical, or is able to define it by its method of preparation, its physical or chemical properties, or whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it. It is not sufficient to define it solely by its principal biological property, e.g., encoding human erythropoietin, because an alleged conception having no more specificity than that is simply a wish to know the identity of any material with that biological property. We hold that when an inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of a gene so as to distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method for obtaining it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to practice has occurred, i.e., until after the gene has been isolated.

These two cases were quoted with approval in *Genentech Inc v. The Wellcome Foundation Ltd.*, 31 USPQ2d 1161 by the U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit, which added further in a concurring opinion "Such a claim, defining a substance only by its function, encompassing all substances that accomplish that result, is akin to a single means claim, which might fail to satisfy the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C Section 112. See *Fiers v. Sugano*, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993)."

Applicants may well now be developing compounds and their practical applications, but the question here is what application they possessed at the time of filing. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences wrote in *Bindra v. Kelly*, 206

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USPQ 570 "*Probable* utility does not establish practical utility. Practical utility can, in our view, be established only by actual testing therefore, or by establishing such facts as would be convincing that such utility could be "foretold with certainty." *Blicke v. Treves*, supra, 112 USPQ at 475."

The specification provides broad areas of future research and speculation, inviting undue experimentation in learning how to use Applicants' invention.

MPEP 2164.01(a) states, "A conclusion of lack of enablement means that, based on the evidence regarding each of the above factors, the specification, at the time the application was filed, would not have taught one skilled in the art how to make and/or use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. *In re Wright*, 999 F.2d 1557,1562, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993)." That conclusion is clearly justified here. Thus, undue experimentation will be required to practice Applicants' invention in the absence of any guidance from the specification, and one would have been unable to practice the invention over the scope claimed.

Double Patenting

A rejection based on double patenting of the "same invention" type finds its support in the language of 35 U.S.C. 101 which states that "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process ... may obtain a patent therefor ..." (Emphasis added). Thus, the term "same invention," in this context, means an invention drawn to identical subject matter. See *Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.*, 151 U.S. 186 (1894); *In re Ockert*, 245 F.2d 467, 114 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1957); and *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970).

A statutory type (35 U.S.C. 101) double patenting rejection can be overcome by canceling or amending the conflicting claims so they are no longer coextensive in scope. The filing of a terminal disclaimer cannot overcome a double patenting rejection based upon 35 U.S.C. 101.


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Claims 3, 4, 6 and 9-34 are provisionally rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as claiming the same invention as that of claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 13 and 15-40 of copending Application No. 09/960,665. This is a provisional double patenting rejection since the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bruck Kifle, Ph.D. whose telephone number is 571-272-0668. The examiner can normally be reached on 9:30-6:00.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Mukund J. Shah can be reached on 571-272-0674. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is (703) 872-9306.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is 703-308-1235.


Bruck Kifle, Ph.D.
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 1624

BK
June 18, 2004